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Abstract Under certain circumstances, speakers are subject to so-called spurious
NPI licensing effects, whereby they perceive that NPIs without a c–commanding li-
censor are in fact licensed and grammatical. Previous studies have all involved the
presence of a licensor in a position that linearly precedes, but does not c–command
the NPI. In this paper, we show that spurious NPI licensing can occur in the outright
absence of a licensor, in contexts that force an exhaustive parse. We reason that at
least these instances of spurious NPI licensing might be reduced to the EXH oper-
ator pragmatically “rescuing” the NPI, in the sense of Giannakidou (1998, 2006).
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1 Introduction
Negative Polarity Items (NPIs), such as any, ever, and at all, are expressions subject
to specific licensing conditions. It is generally agreed that the licensing environment
of NPIs includes Downward Entailing (DE) contexts (e.g. Fauconnier 1975; Ladu-
saw 1979). We assume the formulation of DE in (1) (e.g. von Fintel 1999; Homer
2012).
(1) Downward Entailment
A function f of type h; i is DE iff for all x;y of type  such that x  y:
f (y)  f (x) (where “” stands for cross-categorical entailment).
A characterizing feature of DE contexts is that they support set-to-subset inferences,
as shown below for negation (2) and the restrictor of a universal quantifier (3).
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(2) Negation
a. I don’t like vegetables  I don’t like carrots
b. I like vegetables 3 I like carrots
(3) Universal quantifier
a. Every student with an idea should speak up.  Alex should speak up
b. Some student with an idea should speak up 3 Alex should speak up
Thus, it follows that an NPI can be licensed both under the scope of negation (4)
and in the restrictor of a universal quantifier (5).
(4) Negation
a. I didn’t like the movie at all.
b. * I liked the movie at all.
(5) Universal quantifier
a. Every student with any new idea on NPI licensing should speak up.
b. * Some student with any new idea on NPI licensing should speak up.
What the examples in (a) have in common—and that is crucially missing from the
pairs in (b)—is that they provide DE environments, which, in turn, are responsi-
ble for licensing the NPI. This is captured by the classical definition of the NPI
licensing condition in (6).
(6) NPI licensing condition
An NPI is grammatical only if it occurs in a DE environment.
A standard way to implement the distributional restriction on NPIs has been
to assume that the licensing condition is fundamentally structural. A DE environ-
ment can be taken to be a constituent (e.g. an operator) that is DE with respect to
the position of the NPI. In this approach, a licensor must c–command an NPI in
the syntax, wherein failure to satisfy this structural requirement leads to ungram-
maticality (Ladusaw 1979). For example, in (7b), the negative quantified phrase
no topic modifies the NP headed by the noun assignment such that it occupies a
position from where c–command of the NPI any is impossible, thereby yielding
ungrammaticality.
(7) a. No student of mine liked any of my homework assignments.
b. * The student of mine liked any homework assignment on no topic.
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This simple “grammatical” theory of NPI licensing makes the clear prediction that
in the absence of a c–commanding licensor, a sentence with an NPI should be un-
grammatical.
However, it has been argued that this grammatical theory of NPI licensing is in-
sufficient. A number of experimental studies have shown that, under certain circum-
stances, speakers are subject to so-called spurious NPI licensing effects, whereby
they perceive that ungrammatical NPIs are in fact licensed and grammatical.1 The
relevant paradigm is given in (8). In (8a), the Neg-word no licenses the NPI ever
by virtue of the structural c–commanding position of the DP that it heads. In the
absence of such a Neg-word or other licensor, the sentence is ungrammatical (8c).
Spuriously licensed NPIs are cases like (8b), where there is a licensor present in the
sentence, but it does not c–command the NPI and thus does not meet the structural
licensing condition. In sum, (8b) patterns like (8a) instead of like (8c), even though
there is no accessible licensor in (8b) for the NPI.
(8) a. Grammatical
No mountains that the Swedish hikers have climbed have ever been
taller than 5000 feet.
b. Spurious
The mountains that no Swedish hikers have climbed have ever been
taller than 5000 feet.
c. Ungrammatical
The mountains that the Swedish hikers have climbed have ever been
taller than 5000 feet.
The pattern in (8) has been widely attested under a variety of different experimental
methodologies, languages, and structural configurations. It has been observed in
acceptability judgment tasks (Drenhaus, Saddy & Frisch 2005; Parker & Phillips
2016; Vasishth, Brüssow, Lewis & Drenhaus 2008; Xiang, Grove & Giannakidou
2013; Yanilmaz & Drury 2018), eye-tracking (Vasishth et al. 2008), self-paced read-
ing (Parker & Phillips 2016; Xiang, Dillon & Phillips 2006; Xiang et al. 2013),
and event-related potential (ERP) studies (Drenhaus et al. 2005; Xiang, Dillon &
Phillips 2009; Yanilmaz & Drury 2018). The resulting state of affairs is unex-
pected, as the robust empirical pattern of spurious licensing is in direct conflict
with the clear predictions of the standard grammatical theory of NPIs. This raises
the questions listed in (9).
1 These effects are sometimes classified as “grammatical illusions”, though we will not use such
terminology.
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(9) Main questions
a. What triggers the spurious licensing of NPIs?
b. What is the interpretation of sentences with spuriously licensed NPIs?
In this paper, we provide novel empirical evidence showing that spurious NPI
licensing may also occur in the outright absence of a legitimate overt licensor,
namely in contexts that force an exhaustive parse. We will propose that these cases
of spurious NPI licensing are tied to EXH, a covert exhaustivity operator with simi-
lar syntax and semantics to only. While only is able to license NPIs, we will contend
that the NPI licensing ability of EXH cannot be straightforwardly reduced to that
of only. We instead suggest (i) that these cases of spuriously licensed NPIs are
pragmatically “rescued” by EXH, in the sense of Giannakidou (1998, 2006), and
(ii) that the pragmatic account advanced by Xiang et al. (2009, 2013) for the clas-
sical cases of spurious NPI licensing, e.g. (8), can be reduced to the same kind of
mechanism. Under this proposal, then, spuriously licensed NPIs are interpreted as
ordinary NPIs.
2 Previous accounts of spurious NPI licensing
Previous accounts of spurious NPI licensing effects have sought an explanation in
terms of some form of intervention or interference effect. All of the documented
cases of spurious NPIs involve the presence of an overt licensor in the sentence,
albeit one that does not c–command the NPI. The general line of thinking goes one
of two ways: the mere presence of a licensor suffices either (i) to “partially” or
“superficially” license the NPI or (ii) to induce a pragmatic inference involving an
implicit negation that, in turn, is responsible for the spurious licensing of the NPI.
Let us consider these two approaches in turn.
2.1 Processing account
Under the first approach—which could be considered a processing account—developed
by Drenhaus et al. (2005) and Vasishth et al. (2008), spurious licensing effects re-
flect a (superficial) syntactic licensing process engaged during the incremental pars-
ing of NPIs. Vasishth et al. develop a fully explicit computational model that re-
alizes this “cue-based” parsing model within ACT-R, a cognitive architecture used
for modeling higher level cognition (Anderson 2007). In this parsing framework,
encountering an NPI triggers a search for a licensor in memory. This search is
executed in a content-addressable memory system, guided by retrieval cues that
represent the features that a suitable licensor should have. If those cues match a
representation in memory, it is reactivated (or retrieved), and the NPI is thereby
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licensed. The search for a suitable licensor employs two retrieval cues, [+negative]
and [+c-commander], which must match between the NPI and the licensor (10a).
Spurious NPI licensing happens when a licensor bearing these two features cannot
be found, but a licensor bearing only [+negative] can be. Thus, in (10b), the NPI
partially matches the potential licensor embedded in the relative clause with the cue
[+negative], but crucially not with [+c-commander]. This partial cue-match, com-
bined with stochastic fluctuation of the activation of encodings in memory, means
that occasionally the embedded licensor reaches the reactivation threshold and is
identified as a licensor. Thus, the result of this partial match is the occasional per-
ception that the spurious NPI is syntactically licensed.
(10) a. Grammatical
.No mountains : : : .the Swedish hikers : : : .ever : : :
.
"
+negative
+c-commander
# "
+negative
+c-commander
#
b. Spurious
.The mountains : : : .no Swedish hikers : : : .ever : : :
.
f
+c-commander
g f
+negative
g "
+negative
+c-commander
#
c. Ungrammatical
.The mountains : : : .the Swedish hikers : : : .ever : : :
.
f
+c-commander
g "
+negative
+c-commander
#
There are several problems with this cue-based parsing approach. First, relational
cues such as [+c-commander] are not straightforward to code in a cue-based re-
trieval architecture, because they do not represent the features of a single encoding,
but rather the structural relationship that holds between two encodings (see Vasishth
et al. 2008 and Kush, Lidz & Phillips 2015 for discussion). Second, the role of the
two cues is necessarily asymmetric: only one type of partial match leads to spurious
licensing, viz. [+negative], but not the other type, viz. [+c-commander]. It is not
well understood why [+negative] has this privileged status. Third, NPIs have been
reported to be more prone to spurious effects than other formally similar dependen-
cies, e.g. reflexives, in similar contexts; such between-construction differences are,
however, unexpected on an account that attributes the effects to the memory archi-
tecture of the parser (Xiang et al. 2009). Last, because this parsing model identifies
incremental licensing of NPIs with search for a morphologically negative expres-
sion accessible in memory, it does not realize the right grammatical constraints on
NPI licensing. That is, it does not provide a clear model for how NPIs are incre-
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mentally licensed in DE contexts, it does not predict licensing differences between
the restrictor and the scope of a universal quantifier, amongst other problems (Xiang
et al. 2009). Thus, while this account correctly predicts spuriously licensed NPIs, it
has been difficult to integrate the cue-based parsing approach to these effects with
the standard grammatical account of NPIs, where the structural conditions on the
licensor go hand-in-hand with their specific semantic (logical) properties.
2.2 Pragmatic account
In response to some of these challenges, Xiang et al. (2009) offer a second hy-
pothesis for the source of spurious NPI licensing effects that attributes them to a
pragmatic inference. On their view, the negative quantifier embedded inside the
restrictive relative clause prompts an inference about the complement set of the rel-
evant referent. For instance, in the case of (8b) above, the referent of the DP the
mountains that no Swedish hikers have climbed invites an inference about the prop-
erties that may or may not hold of its complement set, i.e. the mountains that some
Swedish climbers have indeed climbed. Now, given a set A, a sentence of the form
the As P may induce the inference that the A¯s not P. In this case, for an utterance
like the mountains that no Swedish climbers have climbed are P, it is possible to
deduce that it is not the case that the mountains that have indeed been climbed by
Swedish climbers are not P. This pragmatic inference involves an implicit negation
of the properties that may be true of the complement of the referent set, and it is this
implicit negation that has been claimed to interfere with the NPI licensing process,
leading to spurious licensing (Xiang et al. 2009, 2013).
3 Experiment
On the pragmatic account of spurious NPI licensing, it is conceivable that an overt
non-c–commanding licensor is, strictly speaking, not necessary for the effect. As
the source of the spurious effect is a pragmatic inference and not the licensor di-
rectly, the right kind of inference could in principle come about from means other
than an NPI licensor. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a speeded-acceptability
judgement task. The results show that, indeed, spurious NPI licensing can occur in
the outright absence of an overt licensor.
The experiment focuses on contexts involving shortfall (used by Moxey 2006
to investigate complement-set reference): the expectation of what the reference set
of a previously mentioned NP should be, particularly when there is a deficit be-
tween what is expected and what is fact. These shortfall contexts provide discourse
pressure towards an exhaustive parse. To illustrate, consider (11), where the first
sentence creates an expectation to continue talking about all of the plants, an ex-
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pectation that is not met in the second sentence.
(11) Whenever the summer is really dry, Susy expects all of her plants to die.
This year, a small number of the plants have died.
Not parsing the second sentence exhaustively violates theMaxim of Quantity, which
is difficult to cancel, as shown by the oddness of the follow-up in (12).
(12) # : : : In fact, all of them have.
3.1 Method
Materials  The experimental materials consisted of 24 items, each made up of a
context sentence and a target sentence. The items manipulated two factors, for a
total of four conditions: (i) the presence of the NPI ever ([EVER]) and (ii) the
obligatoriness of exhaustive parsing via shortfall ([EXH]). A sample experimental
item is given in (13).
(13) a. [+EXH], [EVER]
Whenever the summer is really dry, Susy expects all of her plants to
die. However, a small number of the plants have fever=;g died.
b. [ EXH], [EVER]
Whenever the summer is really rainy, Susy expects none of her plants
to die. However, a small number of the plants have fever=;g died.
The 24 experimental sentences were interspersed with 24 fillers. Filler accuracy
was used to measure participant attention. Half of the fillers were uncontroversially
grammatical, some of which included NPIs c–commanded by an overt licensor. The
other half of the fillers were uncontroversially ungrammatical, containing person
and number mismatches, voice mismatch under ellipsis, and presupposition failure.
Participants  The experiment included 72 participants, recruited via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. Participants were native speakers of American English and naïve to
the purpose of the experiment. Each participant received a compensation of $1.
Procedure  The experiment was conducted online using the online experimental
platform Ibex Farm (Drummond 2013), and it employed a speeded-acceptability
judgement task. Each trial proceeded as follows:
i. The participant read a context sentence that manipulated shortfall and was
displayed all at once. They had as much time as they needed to read the
sentence and pressed the spacebar to proceed.
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0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
+EVER −EVER
−EXH  +EXH
[+EVER] [ EVER]
[+EXH] 0.59 (0.06) 0.76 (0.04)
[ EXH] 0.27 (0.04) 0.87 (0.03)
Figure 1 Proportion of natural responses and standard errors by condition.
ii. The participant was presented a target sentence with or without ever in a
rapid word-by-word display. Each word was displayed for 225ms+15ms l,
where l is the length of the word in characters.
iii. The participant was asked to judge the target sentence. They answered
VERY NATURAL by keying ‘f’ or NOT SO NATURAL by keying ‘j’.
There was a mandatory break of 10 seconds in the middle of the experiment, after
24 trials. Overall, the experiment took approximately 30 minutes. A progress bar
was displayed throughout the experiment.
Items were arranged in a Latin Square design of four lists such that each list
contained one instance of every item and the four conditions of each item appeared
on separate lists. List assignment and order of presentation were randomized for
each participant.
3.2 Results
Of the 72 participants, those with an overall accuracy less than 70% on the fillers
were excluded from the data analysis; this step eliminated 37 participants so that
35 participants remained. The proportion of ‘natural’ responses by condition are
provided in Figure 1.
We analyzed the results using a logistic mixed effects model with [EXH] and
[EVER] as fixed effects and full random effects structure for subjects and items. The
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proportion of ‘natural’ responses was lower in the [+EVER] condition (z = 8:6;p <
0:05), and there was no main effect of [EXH] (z = 0:7;p = 0:5). There was an inter-
action between the two factors (z = 6:1;p < 0:05). To investigate this interaction,
we ran a second model that nested the factor [EXH] under the levels of [EVER] and
retained the full random effects structure of the original model. This model revealed
a crossover interaction: in [ EVER], the presence of shortfall ([+EXH]) degraded a
sentence (z =  3:1;p < 0:05); in [+EVER], the presence of shortfall improved the
sentence (z = 5:2;p < 0:05).
4 Discussion
The results of the experiment in the previous section show that our expectations
were met: shortfall cases improve acceptance rates of NPIs in the absence of an
overt licensor. Notably, these results are incompatible with the processing account
of spurious NPI licensing because there is no overt licensor that could be retrieved
from memory in the incremental processing of NPIs. We attribute the improvement
in the acceptability of unlicensed NPIs to the presence of the covert exhaustivity
operator EXH, which is obligatorily inserted in shortfall contexts to render them
exhaustive. In what follows, we elaborate on how EXH is able to “rescue” NPIs at
the cost of lower acceptability (e.g. vis-à-vis NPIs licensed by negation or only).
The ensuing question is clear: what makes EXH a good “spurious” NPI licen-
sor? The obvious place to look first is the semantic similarity that EXH bears to the
exclusive particle only, a well-known NPI-licensor (14).2
(14) a. ~onlyw = Chst;ti : phs;ti : p(w) :8q 2 C(p)[q(w)! p  q]
b. ~EXHw = Chst;ti : phs;ti : p(w)^8q 2 C(p)[q(w)! p  q]
The only difference between the two operators is that while only presupposes the
truth of its prejacent, EXH instead asserts it (for discussion, see Chierchia 2013:
ch. 4). This difference is empirically well motivated. For example, B’s reply to A’s
statement in (15) is interpreted exhaustively, and it does not presuppose anything
special (capital letters express focal prominence; example from Chierchia 2013:
33).
(15) A: John is fond of every new student.
B: No, he is fond of PAUL and SUE.
In addition to this difference being empirically well-motivated, it comes with an
important consequence for the purposes of NPI licensing: neither of the two in (14)
are DE. It is controversial what property (or properties) of only make it a good NPI
2 We follow the convention of writing presuppositions as domain restrictions on partial functions.
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licensor. Thus, to understand whether (and, if so, how) EXH is able to increase the
acceptability of otherwise unlicensed NPIs by virtue of its semantic similarity to
only, one must first understand what exactly makes only a licit NPI licensor.
4.1 Licensing NPIs with only
Throughout the paper, we have been assuming that the NPI licensing condition
is (6), repeated below.
(6) NPI licensing condition
An NPI is grammatical only if it occurs in a DE environment.
As discussed in section 1, this condition captures the NPI licensing capacity of most
licensors, including negation and the scope of universal quantifiers. However, it is
well-known that the exclusive focus particle only is also able to license NPIs (16),
an observation that goes back to Klima 1964: 311.
(16) Only young writers ever accept suggestions with any sincerity.
The challenge posed by only is that it is able to license NPIs, but it is not DE. For
example, as shown in (17a), only does not support set-to-subset inferences, unlike
negation (17b).
(17) a. Only Sam likes vegetables 2 Only Sam likes carrots
b. I don’t like vegetables  I don’t like carrots
As such, the NPI licensing capacity of only does not fall under the purview of (6);
this condition is too strong. In the literature, there are two main solutions to this
problem: weakening the licensing condition (von Fintel 1999) and introducing a
secondary mode of NPI licensing (Giannakidou 1998, 2006). Let us consider each
in turn.
4.1.1 Strawson Downward Entailment
Von Fintel (1999) proposes to weaken the NPI licensing condition in (6) by factor-
ing in the presuppositional content of only to the inferential process that allows set-
to-subset entailments. This is done by introducing the notion of Strawson Down-
ward Entailment (SDE) in (18), a minimal modification of (1), and accordingly
modifying the licensing condition of NPIs to be about SDE (19).
(18) Strawson-DE
A function f of type h; i is SDE iff for all x;y of type  such that f (x) is
defined and x  y: f (y)  f (x).
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(19) Modified NPI licensing condition
An NPI is acceptable only if it occurs in a SDE environment.
The virtue of relying on SDE to define (19) is that only is effectively DE if the
presupposition of its prejacent is satisfied. This is illustrated in the reasoning in
(20).
(20) Carrots are vegetables x  y
Sam ate carrots f (x) is defined
Only Sam ate vegetables f (y)
) Only Sam ate carrots ) f (x)
The SDE account of only crucially exploits the idea that the prejacent of only is
presupposed, a matter that has been the object of considerable debate (for dissenting
voices, see Atlas 1993, 1996; Horn 1996; Giannakidou 2006, a.o.). Assuming that
this is the right assessment, however, it is difficult to see how this position may
help us understand the spurious licensing properties of EXH, since by asserting the
prejacent, EXH is neither DE nor SDE, but merely nonmonotonic (21).
(21) a. EXH C [ FOUR students came]. , Exactly four students came.
b. 2 Exactly three students came.
Not only is EXH nonmonotonic, but its treatment as being nonpresuppositional
seems to be on the right track, at least with respect to NPI licensing in canonical
cases: unlike only, EXH cannot license NPIs in simple sentences (22).
(22) a. Only Sam ever visited us.
b. * EXH SAM ever visited us.
As such, under an account where only licenses NPIs because it is SDE, EXH is not
expected to license NPIs.3 That EXH is a spurious licensor, then, must be accounted
for independently of its semantic similarities to only.
3 One could still posit a covert operator that is exactly like only. This is to admit, in other words, that
there is a variant of EXH that presupposes its prejacent, rather than asserting it. Notice, however,
that we should not burden this covert only with the work of ordinary EXH. Assuming that EXH is
freely insertable (minimally) at all propositional nodes, allowing for the same flexibility in the case
of covert only would blur the distinction between presupposition and assertion in ways that would
be difficult to assess. Alternatively, it could be the case that an overt only is inserted at LF, resulting
in effectively licensing the NPI in the ordinary way. In either case, the two proposals would need
to be supplemented by a theory of when exactly this repair mechanism should be deployed, since
unlicensed NPIs do in fact exist.
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4.1.2 Nonveridicality and rescuing
Giannakidou (1998, 2006) proposes a different explanation of the NPI licensing
capacity of only. Following the hierarchy of negative operators in Zwarts (1996),
she argues for an additional mode of NPI licensing, which she calls “rescuing” (23).
(23) Rescuing by non-veridicality [adapted from Giannakidou 2006]
An NPI  can be rescued in sentence S, if (i) the global context C of S
makes a proposition S available which contains a non-veridical expression
, and (ii)  is in the scope of  in S.
According to (23), the relation between the nonveridical expression (e.g. negation)
and the NPI  need only hold in the alternative proposition S0, not in S itself. That
is, an NPI can be rescued by virtue of it being licensed in some alternative S0 that is
made available in the global context of the assertion.
This global context includes not only the assertive content of the proposition,
but also its presuppositions and implicatures (cf. the “assertoric inertia” of Horn
2002, whereby some aspect of meaning becomes assertorically inert, and some
other aspect becomes salient). This mechanism was originally developed to account
for NPI licensing with emotive verbs (Giannakidou 1998). Emotive verbs give rise
to a negative inference that has been characterized either as a presupposition (Baker
1970) or as an implicature (Linebarger 1980). Giannakidou argues that this negative
inference suffices to “rescue” the NPI. For example, any in (24a) is rescued by the
fact that it presupposes/implicates (24b), where any is under the scope of a negative
operator; as such, any is fully licensed in (24a).
(24) a. Sam is surprised that [ Alex has any friends ]p.
b. Sam did not expect that [ Alex has any friends ]p.
Thus, this rescuing mechanism relies on the NPI being able to access a pragmatic
level of representation, as the negative meaning does not necessarily arise from any
logical property of the assertion itself.
In the case of only, Giannakidou proposes that the nonveridical proposition is an
entailment of the sentence (i.e. it is part of the assertion), which suffices to rescue
the NPI despite failing to contribute an SDE or DE environment. By the same
token, EXH would qualify as a good NPI rescuer, to which we turn in the following
section.
4.2 Spurious NPI licensing as rescuing by EXH
The two theories of the NPI licensing capacity of only reviewed in the previous
subsection make divergent predictions with respect to the NPI licensing capacity
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of EXH. While the SDE account predicts that EXH should not be a good NPI
licensor—at least not on the basis of its semantic similarity with only—, the non-
veridicality account developed by Giannakidou predicts that, when it comes to NPI
rescuing, only and EXH should go hand-in-hand. Prima facie, our results are at odds
with both predictions.
We contend that our results lend support to a general view of NPI licensing
where the SDE-based licensing condition in (19) is essentially correct, but that there
exists a second, pragmatic (or indirect) way of rescuing otherwise unlicensed NPIs
(cf. Linebarger 1980, Giannakidou 1998, Xiang et al. 2009, a.o.).
Recall that our shortfall scenarios are such that they require an exhaustive parse
of the target sentence. Failing to do so and accepting a nonexhaustive interpretation
would lead to an incoherent discourse move. The main characteristic of shortfall
contexts, e.g. in (25), is that they introduce a referent set (e.g. all the plants), fol-
lowed by an immediate predication about a proper subset of that set (e.g. a small
number of the plants). Assuming that all the standard pragmatic principles hold—
i.e. the listener assumes that the speaker is being maximally informative, etc.—a
scalar implicature must be calculated; in this case, an inference that the target sen-
tence is about a small number of the plants, but not all of the plants. In the case of
shortfall, not doing so would lead to an incoherent discourse.
(25) Whenever the summer is really dry, Susy expects all of the plants in her
garden to die. However, this summer a small number of the plants have
died.
a. # In fact, all of them have.
The oddness of the follow-up in (25a) is due to the following: The first sentence
sets up the expectation that the discourse will be about all the plants. When this
expectation is not met in the second sentence, the parser is then forced to insert an
exhaustive operator, i.e. EXH, in the second sentence. This in turn renders the last
sentence in the series a contradiction.
In the presence of an NPI such as ever, we submit that the role of EXH is dou-
ble: it not only rescues the discourse coherence of the follow-up sentence, but it
also provides an “assertoric inertia” that sanctions rescuing the NPI (Horn 2002).4
More concretely, we understand this assertoric inertia as making available an alter-
native proposition identical to the assertion but where only takes the place of EXH.
4 The notion of rescuing we are considering here departs slightly from that of Giannakidou (2006).
In her account, rescuing is possible under non-veridical operators. Since only is veridical (only p
entails p), she concludes that only’s veridicality must be somehow “bleached”. Instead, we endorse
the more conservative view that the mechanisms allowing an operator to rescue an NPI must be the
same as those licensing it; i.e., it must be a (S)DE operator.
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Since, by virtue of being a licit licensor, only can license the NPI in the alterna-
tive proposition, we can say that the NPI in the utterance itself is rescued by EXH.
The rescuing process, however, comes at a cost to which ordinary NPI licensing
is not subject. This is reflected in the varying acceptability of the only vs. EXH
variants in (26): while the only version is intuitively grammatical, our results find
that rescuing by EXH drops the acceptability rates to 59%.
(26) Whenever the summer is really dry, Susy expects all of the plants in her
garden to die. However,. . .
a. only a small number of the plants have ever died.
b. EXH a small number of the plants have ever died.
The general pattern that emerges is one where shortfall contexts (our [+EXH] con-
dition) drop acceptability across the board, but despite this lowered acceptability,
there is only a 17% difference in acceptability rates for [ =+ EVER] conditions.
This contrasts with the 50% difference in acceptabilty rates observed for the no
shortfall ([ EXH]) conditions. We take this to indicate that shortfall contexts are
such that they bring saliency to the alternative proposition containing only, thereby
facilitating rescuing the NPI.
Thus, assuming that only is an ordinary NPI licensor (following the SDE ac-
count, for instance), we can draw a line between “licensing” an NPI and “rescuing”
an NPI that accounts for the results reported in section 3.2, while shedding light on
the contrast between only and EXH.
This type of rescuing is moreover very close in spirit to the pragmatic, inference-
based NPI licensing mechanism advocated for by Xiang et al. (2009, 2013) to ac-
count for the classical cases of spurious NPI licensing, e.g. (8). As discussed in
section 2.2, these authors argue that in parsing a sentence like The mountains that
no Swedish hikers have climbed P, speakers may draw a negative inference about
a complement set, e.g. the mountains that Swedish hikers have climbed not P. In
fact, it seems that restrictive modifiers, such as restrictive relative clauses, generally
invite such negative inferences about the complement set of a referent (see Altmann
& Steedman 1988; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers & Carlson 1999, a.o.).
Most previous studies on spurious NPI licensing thus far have used restrictive
relative clauses to host an intervening licensor. We agree with Xiang et al. (2009,
2013) that it is plausible that restrictive relative clauses facilitate the triggering of
such negative inferences about complement sets.
Notably, the experiment presented in this paper does not use restrictive modi-
fiers, nor does it have any type of intervening licensor. Notwithstanding, we believe
that the same explanation can apply to shortfall contexts as well. What classical
spurious NPI cases and the shortfall cases have in common is that they invoke a
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negative inference that would license an NPI in its scope. The two may both then
constitute cases of rescuing, as defined in (23).5
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided the novel empirical contribution that spurious NPI
licensing effects can occur in the outright absence of an overt licensor, in contexts
that force an exhaustive parse. These results are prima facie incompatible with the
cue-retrieval processing account of spurious NPI licensing. We have argued that
spurious NPI licensing effects instead involve pragmatic “rescuing” in the sense of
Giannakidou (1998, 2006).
There are several open questions for future research; we will highlight two here.
In our study, the role of shortfall proved crucial to bring saliency to an alternative
proposition containing only, and so rescue the NPI. This alternative proposition was
made available by EXH, which, by itself does not suffice to rescue and NPI; see (22).
We hypothesize that one decisive factor in shortfall contexts is that they force an
exhaustive parse of the sentence, rendering it a good environment for rescuing NPIs.
Thus, identifying exactly the aspects of shortfall that make EXH a good rescuer is
a question that we are actively exploring in follow-up experiments. The second
question concerns instances where NPIs may occur in the scope of a nonmonotonic
quantifier, like exactly in (27) (first observed by Linebarger 1980), which appear to
be context-sensitive.
(27) a. Exactly two people ever read that dissertation.
b. # Exactly four hundred people ever read that dissertation.
Crnˇic (2014) has recently argued that cases like (27) involve genuine NPI licens-
ing, under a modified theory of NPI licensing that (i) employs a covert operator
EVEN with identical semantics to its overt counterpart, (ii) whose presupposition is
sensitive to contextually available information. However, the pragmatic approach
to spurious NPI licensing raises the question of whether (27) instead involves prag-
matic rescuing as described here, such that (27) should be added to the repertoire
of spurious NPI licensing effects. If true, then under experimental conditions we
would expect (27), even in felicitous cases such as (27a), to have lower acceptability
rates than NPIs licensed via (S)DE.
5 To be clear, we are only applying the notion of rescuing to cases of spurious licensing, i.e. to cases
where the acceptability rates of sentences with NPIs are not as high as those of sentences with fully
licensed NPIs. Thus, we depart from Giannakidou (1998, 2006) in that we do not assume that only
also rescues (rather than licenses) NPIs. For us, rescuing is a pragmatic repair strategy that comes
at cost, and that cost should be detectable in various ways; see section 2.
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